Burkina Faso: the financial cost of proclaimed sovereignty

Since Captain Ibrahim Traoré assumed power, an official narrative has taken hold: that Burkina Faso has reclaimed control over its own destiny, diminished its reliance on external actors, and opted to finance its campaign against armed groups through its own means.

Politically, the message is effective. Rearmament is depicted as the tangible expression of sovereignty. Military acquisitions are highlighted, the Patriotic Support Fund is presented as a demonstration of national effort, and appeals for citizen contributions serve to illustrate that the country would rely first and foremost on its own resources.

Yet a far less ideological question persists: what is the true cost of this sovereignty, and who ultimately bears the burden?

A surge in defence spending

Budgetary figures already reveal a dramatic shift in scale.

Defence and security allocations, which stood at approximately 95 billion CFA francs in 2016, have climbed to several hundred billion CFA francs, surpassing 800 billion in 2024 depending on the budgetary scope considered.

The increase is considerable.

It reflects a clear political priority: in a nation grappling with a major security crisis, the state now devotes a substantially larger share of its resources to the army, security forces, equipment and the war effort.

However, such a steep rise cannot be examined solely through a military lens. Every additional billion allocated to security is also a billion that must be sourced from somewhere.

It is precisely at this juncture that the discourse on sovereignty warrants scrutiny against financial mechanisms.

The Patriotic Fund does not cover everything

The Patriotic Support Fund stands as one of the principal symbols of this strategy.

Contributions have reached substantial amounts since its inception: nearly 99 billion CFA francs in its first year, approximately 175 billion in 2024, and more than 200 billion according to figures released for 2025.

It would therefore be unfair to dismiss the scale of national mobilisation.

Yet another illusion must be avoided: the Patriotic Fund alone does not represent the entirety of war effort financing.

The state budget remains the primary funding structure for public policies. Military expenditures are therefore also sustained by tax revenues, ordinary state resources and, when revenues fall short, by recourse to borrowing.

In other words, contributing voluntarily to the war effort does not mean the war is financed without debt.

Debt takes on a new form

This is where the debate becomes more compelling.

Burkina Faso’s public debt has risen sharply since 2021. It now exceeds 8,000 billion CFA francs according to available data and projections for recent years.

A significant portion of this debt is now raised on the WAEMU regional market, notably through the issuance of public securities.

This enables Burkina Faso to diversify its funding sources and reduce certain dependencies on external creditors.

But debt contracted on the regional market remains debt.

Whether held by a bank, an institutional investor or another financial actor in the region, its economic nature is unchanged: the state borrows today and must repay tomorrow, with interest.

This is where the communication on sovereignty reaches its limits.

One may fully defend the choice to prioritise domestic financing. One may also consider that borrowing from the regional market is preferable to certain forms of external dependency.

But presenting this mechanism as the disappearance of financial dependency would be misleading.

The real question: where does public money go?

The issue is therefore not whether Burkina Faso has the right to rearm. It clearly does.

The issue is determining the cost of this rearmament for public finances as a whole.

When a growing share of resources is directed towards security, the government must arbitrate between multiple priorities: defence, education, health, infrastructure, agriculture, social protection and debt repayment.

These trade-offs are rarely visible in political discourse.

Yet they constitute the true test of economic sovereignty.

A state can purchase more weapons while remaining financially vulnerable. It can reduce certain foreign military cooperations while increasing its reliance on borrowing. It can mobilise patriotic contributions while devoting a growing portion of future revenues to debt repayment.

Diplomatic rupture therefore does not automatically signify financial rupture.

The mechanical effect of debt

There is also a less spectacular but far more enduring risk: that of debt servicing.

Every loan contracted today creates an obligation for the years ahead. When interest rates are high and investment needs remain substantial, the government must allocate more resources to meeting maturities.

It is a simple mechanism: the more the state borrows, the more it must set aside tomorrow a portion of its revenues to pay its creditors.

The problem is not necessarily indebtedness itself. All modern states borrow.

The question is rather whether expenditures financed by debt generate sufficient economic and social benefits to enable the country to bear the future burden.

For military expenditures, the equation is even more delicate: military equipment may be indispensable for national security, but it does not necessarily generate revenues to repay the loan that financed it.

Military sovereignty, economic dependency?

This is the very contradiction the Burkinabè model reveals.

The authorities claim strategic autonomy: new partners, diversified alliances, national mobilisation and reduced traditional cooperations.

Yet simultaneously, the economy continues to function with the classic instruments of public financing: taxation, domestic debt, the regional market, multilateral creditors and economic cooperation.

This is not an exceptional contradiction. It is the normal functioning of a state confronted with limited resources and considerable security needs.

The difficulty begins when political communication transforms this financial reality into a narrative of absolute self-sufficiency.

Beware of spectacular figures

Certain claims circulating on social media also require clarification.

References to military indebtedness of “hundreds of billions of dollars” are incompatible with the scale of Burkina Faso’s economy.

The GDP of Burkina Faso falls within a range of a few tens of billions of dollars, not hundreds of billions. A military debt of several hundred billion dollars would vastly exceed the country’s economic capacity.

The reality is already significant enough that it need not be exaggerated.

It is hundreds of billions of CFA francs at stake, not hundreds of billions of dollars.

This distinction is essential for any serious analysis.

The true paradox of “sovereignty on credit”

Burkina Faso can therefore fully assert political and military sovereignty while remaining an indebted state.

But this reality compels a more demanding question: how far can war financing go without weakening the state’s other functions?

Sovereignty is not measured solely by the number of armoured vehicles, drones or weapons acquired.

It is also measured by the capacity to pay civil servants, invest in education and health, finance infrastructure, support the productive economy and, above all, repay loans contracted in the name of the community.

The real issue is therefore not to deny the efforts made by the Burkinabè authorities. It is to look behind the narrative.

Who pays? How much? With what resources? And for how long?

If a significant portion of rearmament relies on public revenues, national contributions and borrowing, then the proclaimed sovereignty is not a sovereignty without cost.

It is a sovereignty financed by taxpayers, savers, financial markets and future generations.

And it is precisely for this reason that the phrase “sovereignty on credit” deserves to be posed as a question, rather than as a slogan.

For political independence can be proclaimed in a few speeches.

Financial independence, however, is verified in the accounts.