On April 25, 2026, a major military offensive was launched in Mali by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, Al-Qaïda’s Sahelian affiliate) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) against the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian partners in the Afrika Korps. The attack has severely impacted the country’s security and reignited hostilities with Bamako. This offensive revives fears of a takeover of northern Mali, a scenario last seen in March 2012 under a similar rebel and jihadist coalition, albeit in a vastly different political context.

How does 2026 differ from 2012? What short-term outcomes can we expect from this offensive?

The current context: the most ambitious offensive in years

On April 25, 2026, a large-scale offensive targeted five Malian cities: Bamako, the capital, along with Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. For the first time since March 2012, the jihadist group and rebel coalition launched a joint operation of this magnitude: what was once sporadic coordination since 2024 has evolved into a concrete partnership. In all cities, attacks focused on FAMa and Russian positions. In Bamako, symbolic sites such as the Kati officers’ district and the airport were targeted.

A preliminary assessment of the operations can be made, though the situation on the ground remains highly fluid:

• The northern towns have fallen under rebel and jihadist control. The city of Kidal was captured, along with neighboring areas like Tessalit and Anéfis. Towns such as Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit were also seized, gradually encircling Tombouctou and Gao. However, some Malian-Russian military bases in the North remain under control, including in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok.
• Junta leaders were directly hit. The Defense Minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed, and several officials were injured, including General Modibo Koné, head of the National Security Agency (ANSE). Meanwhile, President Assimi Goïta, the junta leader, was reportedly evacuated by his security detail to the Turkish embassy before reappearing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
• Rumors of an attempted junta takeover by General Malick Diaw, another key figure in the regime, were floated but not confirmed. One thing is clear: the military leaders at the helm of power have been severely shaken by this attack.

While this offensive resembles the 2012 assault in some ways, several critical differences stand out:

• The JNIM and FLA are coordinating closely, with the JNIM even allowing FLA leaders to take the spotlight. Unlike Elghabass Ag Intallah and Bilal Ag Cherif of the FLA, JNIM leaders (Iyad ag Ghali, Hamadoun Kouffa) have remained out of the public eye. Only Sidan Ag Hitta, a senior JNIM figure, was spotted in Tessalit.
• Rather than capturing and executing Malian soldiers as in 2012, the two groups are prioritizing negotiations and disarmament, allowing FAMa troops to withdraw before urging others to lay down their arms. They position themselves as defenders of both civilians and soldiers against Bamako’s junta.
• Negotiations with Russian mercenaries enabled them to withdraw from several bases, including in Kidal, without resistance, mirroring tactics seen in Syria. These talks may have been facilitated by Algeria, likely in coordination with the FLA.
• The northern conquest was achieved by simultaneously pinning down FAMa forces in the Center and Bamako. A prolonged attack on Bamako itself is unprecedented.

An anticipated crisis

In a September 15, 2022 article, we warned that Russian military assistance was an illusion, ill-equipped to address Mali’s security challenges and potentially counterproductive. The Russian presence was less about solving Mali’s crisis and more about protecting the military junta and consolidating the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since then, Russian tactics have proven counterproductive, alienating civilians and failing to curb JNIM’s expansion in Mali.

• In January 2023, a foresight exercise anticipated the scenario unfolding today, including:
  The escalation of tensions between the CMA and FAMa/Wagner forces would reignite armed clashes in the North, with the CMA objectively allied with JNIM to regain full control of the Niger River loop and possibly half of Mali’s northern territory.
• The de facto fragmentation of central Mali would lead to regular clashes between the Macina Katibat and community self-defense militias. These militias are unlikely to prevail, and central Mali may gradually fall under JNIM’s effective control.
• The Malian capital would be encircled in its outskirts […] Unless the Malian army collapses entirely, the city is unlikely to fall as it did with the Taliban
• The loss of control over Mali would trigger political tensions and ultimately open the door to political dialogue with JNIM to establish a lasting truce. This could result in the loss of a significant portion of Mali’s territory or even constitutional changes. Pressure from Malian religious institutions would push the government to negotiate.

By November 2023, after the recapture of Kidal by FAMa and Russian forces, we noted that this victory was illusory. The CMA had strategically withdrawn to prepare for a future counteroffensive rather than suffer heavy losses. The short-lived FAMa control over the area was further highlighted by the battle of Tinzawatene in July 2024, culminating in the recent conquest.

These elements confirm that this crisis was anticipated and not a surprise. With this in mind, let’s explore the likely developments in the situation.

Short-term outlook

Militarily, it is likely that the JNIM/FLA coalition will negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces from the North before capturing Gao and Tombouctou, effectively partitioning Mali as occurred in March 2012. At that time, the conquest unfolded in stages: Kidal was taken first, followed by two distinct offensives targeting Gao and Tombouctou. Mass desertions by Malian soldiers accelerated the takeover. Today, under the combined pressure of military strikes and negotiations, FAMa troops may continue to desert due to the breakdown of command chains and political turmoil in Bamako. If Russian forces withdraw from the two major northern cities, the conquest of Gao, Tombouctou, and the entire Niger River loop appears inevitable.

The only factor that could slow a rapid conquest or strong territorial occupation by the rebel-jihadist coalition is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabe TB2 drones. While Malian drones could be targeted by JNIM and FLA using kamikaze drones to strike airfields, it is more challenging for the jihadist group to neutralize Burkinabe or Nigerien drones.

The North of Mali is likely to fall gradually under FLA and JNIM control, especially as the two groups have moderated their objectives. The FLA seeks de facto autonomy for the region without pursuing full political independence for Azawad, while JNIM appears satisfied with a less stringent application of Islamic law. This new reality reduces the likelihood of a scenario like March 2012, where jihadists seized full control of cities, clashed with Arab-Tuareg allies, and imposed brutal governance. Recall that the failure of the jihadist coalition (AQMI, MUJAO, Ansar Charia, and Ansar Eddine) against French forces in 2013 led AQMI leaders to advocate a more gradual expansion, based on preaching and a limited application of Islamic law.

The control of northern Mali will position the armed groups favorably, but with two additional fronts that could mobilize fighters and consume resources: against the Islamic State in the Ménaka region and against airstrikes by Malian and Burkinabe forces.

Unlike in 2012, JNIM fighters are also active in central Mali, and this northern offensive is likely to be accompanied by new attacks on Malian garrisons in towns like Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, Konna, Mopti, and Sévaré. Given that the FLA is unlikely to support operations in this region, these attacks may serve only to disrupt FAMa deployments without aiming for territorial control. Recent reprisals by jihadists against civilians in villages like Kori-Kori and Gomossogou reflect this strategy: the violent targeting of ‘unsubmissive’ populations risks clashing with the current broader political strategy of positioning the groups as alternatives to junta violence. The jihadist command’s difficulty in controlling all factions remains a known weakness.

The fate of central and southern Mali is harder to predict for two reasons. On one hand, JNIM has controlled rural areas for years, frequently besieging towns and negotiating local agreements with communities in exchange for implementing Islamic law—a strategy reminiscent of the Viet Cong in Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan. On the other hand, unlike the Taliban, JNIM lacks the troop numbers to achieve large-scale territorial occupation.

The 2012-2013 control of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou enabled jihadist groups to recruit heavily, particularly from communities in central Mali. If this strategy is repeated, JNIM could significantly strengthen its ranks.

Unless compelled to negotiate, the junta has little incentive to abandon its Russian partnership if it hopes to survive, which may help secure the capital. If the junta continues paying, it can maintain Russian protection in Bamako, but reclaiming lost territory seems improbable. If Russia gradually withdraws support, Mali can only rely on limited aid from Burkina Faso and Niger, both already embroiled in conflicts with jihadists. Senegal may mobilize at its border, but sending troops to Mali seems unlikely given JNIM’s growing threat there. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are likely to adopt observer roles, privately celebrating the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.

Looking ahead:

• The long-term dynamics, observed since 2022, indicate that the fall of the North is inevitable, as is the loss of control over the Center. While the timeline is unclear, the balance of power is stark.
• The medium-term outlook shows that the Russian partnership is fragile and doomed to fail, as is Bamako’s military strategy—a reality underscored by recent events.
• Two potential turning points could emerge:
  o The initiation of negotiations, driven by the junta’s collapse or diplomatic pressure.
  o A foreign military intervention to reverse the balance of power and alter the long- and medium-term dynamics described above.

What’s next for Mali and the international community?

In this context, several scenarios, not mutually exclusive, may unfold.

Scenario 1: Prospects for foreign military intervention

Scenario 2: Prospects for large-scale political negotiations

Since 2025, JNIM leaders have sought a victory akin to the HTC in Syria, implying a gradual acceptance of localizing their struggle, implementing a ‘moderate’ Islamic governance model, and engaging in dialogue with the international community. To achieve this, JNIM has sought a sponsor since 2024, potentially Turkey’s role for the HTC. This role could fall to Algeria or Mauritania. The group is also exploring governance models inspired by these countries. Both nations maintain close ties with FLA leaders, engage with JNIM figures, and oppose Bamako’s junta, though it remains uncertain whether either would accept this role.

This strategy anticipates a conquest by collapsing the junta and negotiating with a political force willing to accept their demands: implementation of Islamic law nationwide; greater autonomy for the North and Center; and integration of JNIM and FLA into local governance.

A significant challenge remains: unlike the HTC, JNIM has not severed its allegiance to Al-Qaïda, nor has it abandoned its intention to export its Islamist project beyond Mali’s borders. Additionally, JNIM does not officially engage with the international community, complicating efforts to normalize its status. Under these conditions, it is unclear whether JNIM could be an acceptable negotiating partner, even with regional and potential European support. The current political framework is unfavorable.

A comprehensive political negotiation would require talks with both the FLA—building on the Algiers Accords—and JNIM, aligning with local agreements negotiated with the High Islamic Committee of Mali.

Progress is unlikely without pressure from Russian, Turkish, or African partners (such as Togo and Ghana) against the junta. In the current climate, it is difficult for Malian political or military forces to regain control through force. The siege of Bamako may increase the likelihood of civil society action or a counter-coup, but systematic repression of opposition since 2020 provides the junta with a degree of security. Until negotiations begin, the strangulation strategy will continue, and captured cities will serve as bases for further attacks on FAMa.

Long-term, France and Europe must recognize that the strategic landscape has shifted. Despite relative normalization, the emergence of a jihadist proto-state will demand heightened vigilance, akin to the approaches used in Syria and Afghanistan to monitor potential terrorist threats. Arab and African partners must be mobilized and supported to help contain and normalize these new international actors.