Russia’s africa corps adjusts strategy in Mali

The Russian Africa Corps is reconfiguring its operational strategy in Mali, redeploying fighters from the northern regions to concentrate on safeguarding the capital, Bamako, and the ruling junta. This strategic shift involves a heightened focus on providing aerial support and critical intelligence to Malian soldiers engaged in ground operations.

They are increasingly adopting a more supporting role, aiming to minimize personnel exposure while maximizing their operational impact. The objective is to avoid further direct engagements that could lead to significant casualties, prioritizing efficiency in their operations.

The Africa Corps took over from the notorious Wagner Group mercenaries around mid-2024. This transition followed substantial losses suffered by Wagner fighters during an ambush orchestrated by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) near Tin Zaouatine, close to the Algerian border, which also involved Malian forces.

As a unit under the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Africa Corps maintains approximately 2,000 personnel on the ground, many of whom are former Wagner mercenaries. This contingent represents a considerable reduction compared to the Wagner force and is roughly half the size of the French Operation Barkhane counter-terrorism force, which the Malian junta expelled in 2022.

The loss of Kidal in northern Mali to the FLA and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) in late April appears to have been a pivotal factor in the Africa Corps’ decision to consolidate its presence around its main base in Bamako.

In response, the Africa Corps launched retaliatory airstrikes against Kidal, which resulted in widespread infrastructure damage and compelled residents to flee. These strikes were carried out to bolster the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), which have now become the primary ground force operating in the country’s northern territories.

There is a clear reliance on air power in their current operations. This has recently included the deployment of Russian-made cluster bombs against communities within the Kidal region. Such actions contravene Mali’s commitments under international conventions prohibiting the use of cluster munitions.

With fewer resources at their disposal, the Africa Corps is hesitant to disperse its forces across small communities in the North, where they could be vulnerable to attrition.

An analysis of recent Africa Corps communications on social media platforms reveals a distinct pivot towards central and southern Mali, with the majority of their operations now concentrated near Bamako.

Following the withdrawal from Kidal, the Africa Corps significantly ramped up its propaganda efforts, publishing over 500 articles across Telegram and other channels in the weeks immediately following the setback.

Beyond airstrikes, the Africa Corps has also endeavored to circumvent economic blockades imposed by the GSIM in Mali. Their fighters, supported by aerial assets, have begun escorting truck convoys entering this landlocked nation from Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Senegal, providing protection against potential GSIM attacks.

Even as the Africa Corps seeks to reduce its direct exposure on the battlefield, the GSIM is increasingly utilizing drones to target Russian fighters at their bases. Recent GSIM videos shared on social media depict drone footage showing Russian fighters being killed and Russian aircraft sustaining damage from bombs dropped on their Sévaré base.

In turn, the Africa Corps has initiated its own armed drone strikes against GSIM positions in recent weeks, including a successful strike on a GSIM fuel depot located in the Timbuktu region.

Since late 2021, Mali has allocated nearly one billion dollars to secure the services of the Wagner Group and subsequently the Africa Corps. During this period, the Malian government and its Russian allies have lost significant control over the North, while the GSIM has expanded its influence across the Sahel. This expansion is, in part, attributed to the brutal tactics employed by both Russian forces and the FAMa against civilian populations in the North, which inadvertently pushes communities towards the GSIM.

The strategy adopted by the Malian state appears counterproductive, ultimately jeopardizing state stability. Regrettably, the outcome is an increase in GSIM’s power as alienated communities are driven into its embrace.