Burkina Faso’s intricate path: navigating post-compaoré political transition

The interpretation of a coup d’état frequently shifts, often influenced by the international community’s prevailing interests and discretion, a stance often endorsed by neighboring states. In this context, the “designation” of Transitional President Michel Kafando lacked constitutional grounding. Consequently, Burkina Faso was set to operate for at least twelve months under newly established, ad-hoc institutions.

Like a carefully assembled construction, Burkina Faso’s transitional institutions gradually took shape. Following the dramatic appearance of military uniforms on the public stage, in the immediate aftermath of Blaise Compaoré’s swift departure from Kosyam, Ouagadougou began to experience a renewed sense of calm.

Emerging seemingly from obscurity, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida quickly dominated the political landscape, assuming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. His true intentions, however, remained a subject of speculation. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protestors and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, in an attempt to retain control of power, a pre-arranged decision between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the people naturally sparked apprehension and considerable suspicion. The military’s actions and decrees in the initial days – including the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly – raised fears of a junta taking hold. It seemed the populace, having sacrificed and shed blood, might be deprived of their hard-won victory.

True to form, the African Union promptly threatened to sanction Burkina Faso. Simultaneously, a delegation of ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived to assess the situation with the military leadership, urgently pressing them to reconsider their position. The precedents set by previous military leaders, such as Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali, undoubtedly compelled Burkinabé officers to deliberate carefully. They understood that seizing power by force would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation, leading to escalating unpopularity.

Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise solution, formally codified in the Charter of the Transition. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the Executive as Transitional President, while the military would maintain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who had spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising around twenty members, was entrusted with the crucial task of appointing a Transitional President. This fixed-term mandate was set to conclude in November 2015, aligning with the original end of President Blaise Compaoré’s term.

For the selection of the Head of State, each segment of the nation’s vital forces – the military, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. In the end, five individuals were chosen for consideration:

The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who directs the weekly publication L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ outspoken criticism of the former regime. The military, adopting a broader approach, diversified its candidate profiles: an ecclesiastical figure, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the Archbishop, initially a strong contender, publicly declined interest in the role, preferring to focus on his current ministry.

The two remaining candidates held a distinct advantage over the others: their extensive experience within major international institutions. Ms. Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his country at the UN headquarters in New York, first between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the Land of the Upright Men, an invisible divide separates the populace into pro-Sankara and anti-Sankara factions. This implicit cleavage has historically shaped every political figure’s trajectory. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government in 1982, under the presidency of Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and were ideologically diametrically opposed.

A career within an international institution offers dual benefits: an enhanced resume and an expanded network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.

For a few crucial months, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, would put aside his cattle and poultry farming in Saponé for a noble cause: to safeguard the nation in peril. He would simultaneously hold the Transitional Presidency and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role conveniently streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single interlocutor and effectively bypassing the head of government, Isaac Zida.

The evolving situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored from various capitals: Accra, which currently chaired ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical reasons. On the day of Michel Kafando’s investiture, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (African Union), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to attend, signaling a rehabilitation of Burkina Faso. Did this significant representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The Americans, in principle, refrain from cooperating with unelected heads of state, a situation currently applicable to Burkina Faso. Yet, the international community found a way to legitimize the coup and establish a constitutional substitute. Consequently, American reconnaissance planes remained stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for surveillance across the Sahel region.

Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four pivotal roles: the Prime Minister also assumed the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, was tasked with Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida’s spokesperson, took charge of Sports; and Boubacar Ba was appointed to the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo received the position of Keeper of the Seals – a form of consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who had inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned merely days after his appointment, succumbing to civil society pressure regarding his alleged handling of the Norbert Zongo case as a former prosecutor.

The National Transitional Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the Transitional Presidency, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The focus now shifts to completing the institutional framework and mechanisms that will guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), the electoral code, and relevant organic laws.

What missions lay ahead for this brief transitional period?

Since the beginning of December, Michel Kafando has signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate remain to be fully defined. More than 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the Land of the Upright Men aims to finally embark on a process of catharsis. Immediately following his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a role, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would seek Blaise Compaoré’s “extradition” from Morocco.

Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders have opened a Pandora’s box. Such complex cases demand a considerable timeframe, likely extending beyond the transitional period. Were these declarations made to appease opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s primary focus. In this regard, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.

Will Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma maintain their loyalty to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso successfully defused the political crisis of October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with relatively few complications. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial skirmishes could have triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to concentrate on holding elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by reopening the Sankara case?

How can a “witch hunt” be avoided? Two general directors of major national enterprises, perceived as close to the ousted president’s family, have already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition does not fully absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, a national tribute was paid to the seven individuals who fell victim to gunfire during the events of October 30 and 31. They now rest in the Gounghin cemetery.

Will the CRNR endure beyond the conclusion of the transitional period? With all institutions now in place, political figures and parties are poised to take center stage. No prominent political leader sought a seat in either the Executive or the CNT, effectively disqualifying them from running in future general elections. Presidential candidates are already in the starting blocks. The formation of the CNT also prompted the self-dissolution of the CFOP, the opposition coalition. The electoral contest is certainly expected to intensify at the very beginning of 2015.