Senegal’s hidden debt controversy: legal scrutiny for economic falsehoods?

It is now unequivocally clear that the narrative surrounding the so-called hidden debt, initially brought to public attention by Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko during a press conference on September 26, 2024, constituted a significant falsehood. Despite warnings from informed observers, a robust propaganda apparatus worked to sustain these unsubstantiated claims within the public discourse.

Given that the principal individual involved has now conceded that his statements diverged from the truth, and considering the severe repercussions these declarations had on Senegal’s international credibility, its relationships with partners, and the hardships faced by its citizens, a critical question arises: Can the Public Prosecutor initiate proceedings against Ousmane Sonko for economic high treason, dissemination of false economic information, and lying? Furthermore, should all those who knowingly perpetuated this deception also face charges of complicity?

To properly assess this matter, it is essential to differentiate between political contention and its potential legal ramifications. Not only the substance of the statement but also the speaker’s official capacity, the context in which it was delivered, and its impact on public trust in the state are crucial considerations.

“When I spoke on certain occasions, I spoke as a political party leader expressing an opinion.” This assertion by Ousmane Sonko, made during an interview, presents a significant legal and institutional challenge. Accusations that adversely affected the perception of the Senegalese economy cannot be dismissed as mere partisan positions when they originated from an authority holding governmental office. As Prime Minister, with administrative authority as stipulated by Article 57 of the Constitution, the individual making such pronouncements inherently engaged the state’s authority and could influence the confidence of Senegal’s external partners.

The sequence of events related to the alleged “hidden debt” exemplifies this ambiguity. By claiming he was speaking as a party leader and did not yet possess “all the levers of the state,” Ousmane Sonko attempted to reframe his remarks as political opposition. However, this justification must be weighed against the institutional framework in which the issue was subsequently presented to the public. Indeed, it was not merely a partisan address. It was a government press conference featuring, alongside Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko, the Minister-Secretary General of the Government, the Minister of Economy, and the Minister of Justice. On that day, the debt issue was presented with particular gravity and reiterated in official settings, including a press conference at the Prime Minister’s office and before members of parliament. Under these circumstances, the words could no longer be equated with those of a simple political figure; they represented the public statement of a Prime Minister and, as such, committed the authority of the state.

belated clarification

Logical consistency therefore demands a distinction between two levels. On one hand, political critique remains legitimate when based on verifiable facts. On the other hand, when an accusation is presented in an institutional context and impacts public or financial confidence, it must be supported by sufficiently established evidence. Failing this, its authors are exposed to accountability, not only politically but also institutionally. This leads to the question of whether the Prosecutor can intervene regarding the dissemination of false economic news. This differentiation naturally prompts an examination of the Court of Auditors’ role. While political interpretations fueled the controversy, it is appropriate to refer to the findings of the institution responsible for auditing public accounts to gauge the discrepancy between the report itself and the interpretations derived from it.

In this context, an interview given by Mamadou Faye, a former President of the Court of Auditors, to a local publication, reignited the debate. By affirming that the Court of Auditors’ report nowhere mentioned the term “hidden debt,” the former magistrate offered a clarification that many deemed belated. When questioned about the existence of a “hidden debt,” the magistrate referred to the report itself, emphasizing that no page explicitly used this qualification. This clarification is crucial: it distinguishes the technical findings of the Court from the political interpretations that may have been drawn. Indeed, for two years, he observed Ousmane Sonko, in apparent complicity with Bassirou Diomaye Faye, steering Senegal into a fruitless debate without ever intervening. Mamadou Faye would have been better off remaining silent. However, reflecting on the publication of the February 2025 report, he reiterated that the institution confined itself to presenting its findings according to its specific auditing methods. He also detailed the Court’s working methodology. The debt-to-GDP ratio was calculated using the TOFE method (Table of Government Financial Operations) and the budgetary method, based on the difference between revenues and expenditures relative to GDP. According to this explanation, both approaches should have yielded consistent results if the reconciliation table had been correctly applied.

Thus, the mere absence of an explicit mention of “hidden debt” does not definitively close the discussion, but it weakens the political characterization that was made. It shifts the focus of the debate: it is no longer solely about whether accounting irregularities existed, but about determining if their public presentation was accurate, proportionate, and legally responsible.

The controversy surrounding this economic falsehood is far from neutral. By persisting without firm clarification, it contributed to undermining Senegal’s financial credibility, fostering uncertainty among economic actors, and negatively influencing rating agencies. The accountability of public officials must therefore be assessed in light of the foreseeable effects of their declarations, especially when these pertain to debt, the integrity of public accounts, and the state’s capacity to honor its commitments.

State financial credibility at stake

This analysis echoes previous warnings highlighting that imprudent governmental communication on debt could erode market confidence, trigger negative investor reactions, lead to a downgrade in sovereign rating, and increase borrowing costs. Such effects, if realized, can subsequently diminish budgetary flexibility, hinder investment, and impact employment.

Following the publication of the Court of Auditors’ report, the objective was not to transform administrative dysfunctions into a political scandal, but to precisely determine their nature, scope, and legal consequences. The report primarily called for an administrative, budgetary, and institutional response: correction of procedures, enhancement of accounting traceability, and clarification of any responsibilities.

This demand for rigor extends beyond public debt. It applies more broadly to any dramatic economic statement likely to compromise the state’s credibility or create public expectation without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The same standard applies to assertions regarding the alleged existence of 1000 billion CFA francs in an account attributed to a former dignitary of the previous regime. A declaration of this nature, particularly when originating from a public official, cannot rest on mere assertion. It must be supported by verifiable elements, capable of scrutiny by competent judicial authorities or authorized control bodies. Otherwise, it fuels confusion, weakens institutional trust, and exposes its author to accountability challenges. The call for the Prosecutor to initiate proceedings is not merely a partisan dispute. It refers to a broader principle: public speech, especially from a governmental authority, must be proportionate, verifiable, and compatible with the requirements of institutional stability. When economic declarations are liable to affect the state’s financial credibility, it falls upon the competent institutions to assess whether they belong to ordinary political debate or warrant a more thorough examination under applicable law.

Beyond this specific controversy, the question also highlights the enduring role of control institutions. The credibility of public discourse indeed relies on the capacity of competent bodies to produce regular, transparent, and indisputable findings to inform democratic debate.

post-scriptum: challenges for the court of auditors

The new President of the Court of Auditors meets all the qualifications, making his appointment a culmination of a long and distinguished career within this institution. However, he is a transitional president (with less than three years until retirement) and, crucially, a mission-driven one. He must address four key challenges. The first is ensuring the consistent publication of annual reports. The second is finalizing the reform of the Court of Auditors to align it with international standards. The third involves opening the institution to technical professions (petroleum and gas engineers, infrastructure experts, chartered accountants, public health specialists), leveraging internal expertise through a career development plan for auditors within the institution, to highlight the Court’s significant achievements, and crucially, engaging with citizens for better understanding of the Court’s missions and activities. Finally, the fourth challenge concerns strengthening the professionalization of the Court’s functions (account certification and evaluation of public policies).