Sahel’s escalating crisis: is negotiation with jihadist groups an unavoidable reality?

Following the synchronized assaults on April 25 and 26 that struck Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unspoken question has re-emerged within Mali’s security discussions: should dialogue be initiated with jihadist factions? Given the significant scale of the offensive, executed jointly by Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Touareg insurgents of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), a growing number of analysts and experts now contend that a purely military approach is proving insufficient.

This offensive has rapidly extended its reach across Mali, from its northern to southern regions, at an unprecedented pace. Armed entities launched multiple coordinated strikes against military personnel and governmental symbols in at least six urban centers, reaching as far as the outskirts of Bamako. Notably, Jnim and the FLA have openly collaborated in these operations for the first time. Established in November 2024 subsequent to the dissolution of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP), the FLA advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast northern Malian territory.

These recent assaults have starkly revealed the Malian regime’s inherent fragility. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor their Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the advance of these armed factions. Within regional media and diplomatic spheres, the prospect of engaging in negotiations with Jnim is now being discussed with increasing candor, against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual strangulation and broader regional entanglement. Despite this, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue. Bamako steadfastly maintains its exclusion of « tout dialogue avec les groupes armés terroristes », adhering to a purely military stance even as the security landscape deteriorates swiftly.

Since late April, the strain on the regime has intensified relentlessly. Violence is escalating across the country’s central regions. Just last Friday, numerous villages in the Bankass area, including Kouroude and Dougara, came under assault. Local and security reports indicate that the combined fatalities from the Wednesday and Friday attacks range from 70 to 80 individuals.

A novel alliance, a stark warning

Jnim continues to be the primary force driving the jihadist surge across the Sahel, impacting Mali significantly, alongside Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas comprising the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the situation is becoming increasingly constrained. Despite seizing power with pledges to re-establish security, these regimes struggle to curb a threat that persistently expands. In Mali, for almost a year now, hostile actions have been steadily encroaching closer to the capital.

« Beginning in July 2025, jihadist groups initiated assaults in western Mali, targeting both gold mining operations and industrial facilities. Subsequently, they focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively choking the capital », notes Alain Antil, director of the Ifri’s Sub-Saharan Africa Center. Héni Nsaibia of Acled observes, « What is striking this time is not merely the scale of the operation, but also the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very core of the regime. »

The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati has significantly destabilized the government. Concurrently, the recapture of Kidal in late 2023, hailed as a critical triumph, now stands as a substantial strategic setback.

The strategy of attrition

Even prior to this latest offensive, various specialists had noted a shift in Jnim’s tactical approach. Alain Antil had previously explained, « There is a clear intention to establish a more dominant power dynamic, achieved not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities into negotiations. »

The jihadist organization is now attempting to replicate on a national scale tactics previously tested locally: economic blockades, the gradual encirclement of urban centers, and sustained pressure on crucial logistical routes. The researcher emphasizes, « Jnim is endeavoring to enforce an economic blockade around Bamako. »

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa views this strategy as a long-term endeavor: « They have opted to undermine the government from within, prioritizing a strategy of protracted engagement and exploiting the military system’s existing vulnerabilities. » He further states, « Jnim no longer insists on the implementation of Sharia law as a prerequisite for peace and now expresses openness to negotiation. »

Within this volatile environment, the ongoing rivalry with the État islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as both groups strive to expand their territorial control and exert greater influence.

A once-taboo option gains prominence

Officially, Sahelian governments reject any notion of engaging in dialogue. Alain Antil observes, « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation remains off the table. Their rhetoric is consistently martial, presenting military action as the sole viable solution. »

However, the reality on the ground presents a more intricate picture. Atrocities perpetrated by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, approximately 1,500 civilians in Mali were killed by government forces and their Russian partners—a figure nearly five times higher than those attributed to Jnim, according to the GI-TOC. This cycle of violence fuels resentment and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment efforts.

States must commit to a courageous compromise.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel researcher

Confronted with this stalemate, an increasing number of specialists advocate for a shift in approach. Alain Antil of Ifri asserts, « A military-only solution is a dead end against the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be paired with political negotiations. » Certain grievances articulated by these groups—such as corruption, demands for justice, and access to resources—could potentially serve as a foundation for discussions, without overlooking the violence they perpetuate.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa takes this perspective further: « States must resolve to a courageous compromise. The aim would be to integrate jihadists into the political process to expose their limitations. » However, he establishes clear boundaries: « The principles of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable. »

As jihadist offensives continue their advance, the concept of negotiation is transforming from a heresy into a plausible political strategy. For many experts within Mali, the pertinent question is no longer whether dialogue should occur, but rather how much longer Bamako can realistically avoid it.