What Mali’s US-Russia balancing act means for citizens and the economy

From Moscow to Washington: a shift that touches everyday life

For years, Mali’s alignment with Russia was presented as a clean break from Western influence. After expelling French and European forces, Bamako under General Assimi Goïta turned to Moscow as its main security partner, welcoming Wagner fighters and later Africa Corps personnel while gradually severing ties with Western partners.

But in 2026, that story is showing cracks. Mali has not officially abandoned Russia. Yet signs of a rapprochement with the United States are multiplying: intelligence cooperation, talks on American surveillance flights, and the lifting of sanctions on senior Malian officials all point to a changing course. The real-world effects are already being felt — from the security of ordinary citizens to the economic pressures on businesses and the country’s broader stability.

Washington’s quiet return and its impact on the ground

The most striking shift concerns military intelligence.

In March 2026, reports emerged that Washington and Bamako were close to an agreement allowing the United States to resume aircraft and drone flights over Mali to monitor jihadist groups, particularly JNIM, an Al-Qaeda affiliate. The talks followed a US decision in February to lift sanctions against Mali’s defense minister and several senior officials.

This development is far from trivial.

During the period of tension with Western powers, Bamako had portrayed Russia as the partner capable of replacing former Western powers. Today, Malian authorities are again willing to discuss with Washington the capabilities they clearly need: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

The United States had already shared intelligence with Malian authorities, some of which reportedly contributed to an operation against JNIM leaders. Washington now seeks to institutionalize this cooperation further.

The paradox is striking: Mali, which had turned its back on the West to move closer to Moscow, may be rediscovering Washington’s strategic value. For citizens, this could mean better-targeted operations against jihadists — but also more uncertainty as alliances shift.

Russia’s security record: a burden for Bamako

Why is this change happening now? Part of the answer lies in the security record of recent years.

To be precise: the arrival of Wagner in Mali does not mean that the entire security deterioration is attributable to Russia. The country was already facing a jihadist insurgency before French forces left. Armed groups have deep local roots and benefit from political, social, economic and geographic factors that go far beyond the presence of a foreign power.

But statistics show a reality that is hard to ignore: replacing Western partners with Russian forces did not durably stem the violence.

The US State Department’s 2022 report indicated that terrorist activities had increased in number and lethality. That year, France completed its withdrawal from Mali, with the last French soldier leaving on August 15, 2022. Meanwhile, Malian forces occupied former French positions with Wagner’s support. The State Department called 2022 the deadliest year in Mali’s history in terms of terrorist violence and counterterrorism operations.

The following year did not reverse the trend.

According to the 2023 US terrorism report, terrorist activities increased further in number and intensity. The document describes 2023 as the deadliest year in Mali’s history, taking into account both terrorist attacks and operations by Malian forces conducted with Wagner.

The finding is particularly embarrassing for the narrative that presented the Russian partnership as the solution to Mali’s security problem. For businesses, persistent violence means disrupted supply chains, higher costs and a climate of uncertainty that discourages investment.

From Wagner to Africa Corps: Moscow has not disappeared

It would be premature, however, to announce Russia’s departure.

Wagner has been gradually replaced by Africa Corps, directly linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow therefore retains a significant military and political presence in Mali.

But this presence is also experiencing setbacks.

In April 2026, an offensive by JNIM and Tuareg fighters inflicted serious losses on Malian forces and their Russian allies. Mali’s defense minister, Sadio Camara, trained in Russia, was killed in an attack. Africa Corps also had to withdraw from Kidal, a strategic northern city it had helped recapture in 2023.

Reports at the time indicated that these setbacks had seriously damaged Russia’s image as a guarantor of security in Mali. ACLED analyst Héni Nsaibia even argued that JNIM’s successive campaigns, the fuel blockade and recent events illustrated the failure of the Russian intervention.

This is obviously an analysis, not a universal verdict. But it illustrates a problem that has become difficult to ignore: Moscow has not succeeded in ending the insurgency. For citizens, this means continued displacement, lost livelihoods and a daily struggle for safety.

Security still under pressure

Figures available in 2025 reinforce this questioning.

According to ACLED data cited by Reuters, Malian forces and Russian paramilitary groups Wagner and Africa Corps reportedly killed 918 civilians in Mali in 2025, compared to 232 attributed to JNIM and Islamic State in the Sahel. These figures concern documented deaths and must therefore be interpreted with caution. They nevertheless reflect the scale of violence and accusations against government forces and their Russian allies.

At the same time, jihadists continued to advance. JNIM notably managed to disrupt the country’s supply routes and impose considerable pressure on Bamako.

In March 2026, Malian authorities even released around 200 people detained for alleged links to jihadists as part of an arrangement to secure a truce on attacks on fuel convoys.

For a junta that came to power promising to restore sovereignty and security, the symbol is heavy. The economic consequences are tangible: fuel shortages, rising prices and a business environment crippled by insecurity.

Mali may no longer be choosing between Moscow and Washington

It would be too early, however, to speak of a break with Russia.

Moscow retains considerable interests in Mali, particularly in gold, lithium and energy. Russia has supported mining and energy projects and continues to affirm its commitment alongside Bamako.

Mali’s strategy therefore seems to be evolving toward a pragmatic logic: no longer depending on a single partner.

After making Moscow its main security recourse following the French departure, Bamako now appears to recognize that Russia alone cannot meet all its military and intelligence needs.

This is where the United States reappears.

Washington offers what Moscow does not necessarily provide under the same conditions: aerial and satellite intelligence capabilities, considerable technological resources and in-depth knowledge of jihadist networks.

The rapprochement with America may therefore be less an ideological conversion than a pragmatic observation: Mali needs multiple partners to confront a threat that its alliance with Russia has not managed to eliminate.

From Western rupture to pragmatism

Mali’s recent history is thus undergoing another reversal.

Yesterday, Bamako denounced the French and European presence and presented Russia as the sovereign alternative. Today, discussions with Washington are resuming at a level that would have seemed improbable just a few years ago.

Russia remains in Mali. But its security record is contested, its forces have suffered setbacks and jihadists continue to threaten the country.

In this context, the US-Mali rapprochement appears as much more than a simple diplomatic episode. It could mark the beginning of a new foreign policy for Bamako: no longer replacing one partner with another, but leveraging rivalry between great powers to obtain what Mali needs from each. For citizens and businesses, the stakes are high — a more diversified approach might bring better security and economic stability, but only if the country can navigate the competing interests without falling deeper into conflict.

Mali has not yet abandoned Russia. But one thing is now clear: the Russian monopoly on Mali’s security partnership may already be a thing of the past.

By Ramatou Soumana — Reporter