Malian tankers trucks drives at the entrance of Boundiali, northern Ivory Coast, on October 30, 2025 on the way to Yamoussoukro and Abidjan to load oil. In northern Ivory Coast, truck drivers prepare to head back to neighbouring Mali, aboard their tanker trucks loaded with fuel and anxiety. One acronym strikes fear into the hearts of all the truck drivers: JNIM, the name of the jihadist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda that decreed two months ago that no more tanker trucks would be allowed to enter Mali from a neighboring country. Since then, hundreds of trucks have been set ablaze, selling fuel from Abidjan or Dakar, and are part of JNIM’s economic jihad strategy, which aims, among other things, to strangle Bamako and the ruling military junta. In 2023, more than half of the petroleum products exported by Côte d’Ivoire were destined for Mali. Malian trucks load up in Yamoussoukro or Abidjan before crossing one of two corridors into the country: the Tengréla corridor or the Pogo corridor, where military escorts take over on the Malian side, all the way to Bamako. An escort can consist of several hundred tankers. But even under escort, convoys are frequently targeted. The most dangerous areas in southern Mali are the Kadiana-Kolondiéba and Loulouni-Sikasso axes. (Photo by Issouf SANOGO / AFP)
The JNIM blockade threatens West African commercial exchanges
Recent terrorist attacks in Mali have intensified the obstruction of major trade arteries connecting coastal and Sahelian states.
Bosch research fellow, regional office for West Africa and the Sahel, ISS
On April 25, a coordinated series of assaults by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) rocked Mali. These aggressive actions targeted key cities like Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, and the capital, Bamako, resulting in numerous casualties and the tragic assassination of Defense Minister Sadio Camara.
In response, Malian authorities initiated a counter-offensive against the groups’ strongholds. The military prosecutor in Bamako also announced the apprehension of several individuals, including civilians, active-duty soldiers, and former army personnel, suspected of involvement.
Just five days following the initial attacks, JNIM established a blockade around the capital, specifically targeting vital routes in the country’s western region. The complete closure of the Kita-Bamako road stranded hundreds and severely hampered the delivery of essential food and water supplies.
This siege has significantly disrupted commercial activity, bringing all traffic on the Kayes-Bamako corridor to a halt. Furthermore, the blockade’s expansion now includes assaults on transport convoys along the Conakry-Bamako route, which previously enjoyed relative security.
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Mali and neighboring coastal countries
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Since September 2025, JNIM has strategically targeted fuel convoys along critical supply routes in western and southern Mali. These assaults destabilize commercial exchanges and, if allowed to proliferate, threaten to severely impact the broader West African economies.
West African nations are intrinsically linked through their robust trade networks. Coastal state ports serve as crucial entry and exit points for the landlocked countries of the Central Sahel. The highway corridors connecting these ports to Sahelian capitals and beyond function as economic lifelines, many of which unfortunately traverse areas where JNIM operates.
The Dakar-Bamako corridor stands as a strategic artery for both Senegal and Mali, currently bearing the brunt of the escalating insecurity in western Mali.
In 2024, Mali was Senegal’s primary client, accounting for a significant 26.5% of its exports, valued at approximately 802.8 billion FCFA (1.42 billion US dollars). Over the first nine months of 2025, cumulative Senegalese exports to Mali reached an estimated 662 billion FCFA (1.17 billion US dollars).
Data from Senegal’s Directorate of Forecasting and Economic Studies (2025) indicates that JNIM attacks in western Mali have had a substantial impact on trade between the two nations compared to 2024 levels. From September to November 2025, the Port of Dakar experienced a daily backlog of approximately 120 containers bound for Mali, translating into an estimated monthly loss of 15 billion FCFA (26.54 million US dollars) for Senegal. By late November 2025, over 2,000 containers were stranded in Dakar. Further exacerbating the issue, by February 2026, around 4,000 empty containers were stuck in Bamako, as truck drivers feared traversing the perilous return route to Dakar.
This critical situation severely curtails Mali’s access to vital petroleum products, refined goods, hydraulic cement, and foodstuffs. It also jeopardizes the livelihoods of thousands of drivers, traders, and freight forwarders. Concerns are rising that other crucial corridors, particularly those connecting the ports of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Bénin to the Sahel, could face similar threats.
In 2025, Mali remained Côte d’Ivoire’s leading client within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The Abidjan-Bamako corridor is indispensable for supplying Mali with petroleum products and food. By the end of 2025, approximately 1.47 million tonnes of goods had moved along this route, which is now increasingly targeted by JNIM attacks in the Sikasso region.
Côte d’Ivoire also serves as Burkina Faso’s top African supplier, primarily providing petroleum products, electricity, and fertilizers. Burkina Faso’s imports either originate from or transit through Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. On February 14, seven Ghanaian tomato traders were killed during a JNIM assault in Titao, northern Burkina Faso, starkly highlighting the security risks on the road connecting these nations. Currently, the terrorist threat remains most acute within Malian territory, prompting authorities to implement various countermeasures. Since November 2025, fuel convoys have received military escorts, enabling 200 to 300 tanker trucks to enter weekly, a significant drop from the nearly 1,200 trucks before the attacks commenced.
The Malian government has signed a memorandum of understanding with Malian petroleum groups to streamline and expedite customs procedures. A fuel rationing system has also been introduced to combat the burgeoning black market. Additionally, authorities are exploring options to alleviate pressure on the ports of Dakar and Abidjan by rerouting some commercial flows to alternative port infrastructures.
Reports had circulated about a potential truce between Bamako and jihadist groups until Eid al-Adha, purportedly in exchange for the release of over a hundred terror-accused prisoners. However, attacks persisted, and Malian authorities officially denied any such agreement.
The April 25 attacks underscore the inherent limitations of Mali’s predominantly military response to terrorism. While JNIM and FLA managed to set aside their differences to execute these large-scale offensives, Sahelian and coastal states struggle to forge effective alliances.
The regional repercussions of the JNIM-imposed blockade highlight the critical need for a united approach to protect cross-border commercial corridors. Governments and regional bodies, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the Conseil de l’Entente, the Mano River Union, and UEMOA, must act decisively to prevent this destabilizing phenomenon from spreading to other vital routes.
Ultimately, the shared challenge of counter-terrorism could serve as the catalyst for an essential revival of regional cooperation among West Africa’s Sahelian and coastal states.
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