Sahel states alliance faces hurdles in joint defense efforts in Niger

Nearly a year after the formal establishment of its charter and confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, frequently faces scrutiny regarding its ability to fulfill its primary commitment: mutual defense. Amid recent security escalations and significant jihadist assaults impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a unified armed response has prompted questions among local populations and regional observers. This operational inertia within Niger’s borders can be attributed to several structural and strategic factors impacting Sahel security cooperation.

Saturated national armies

A primary constraint remains the overextension of national armed forces. Each member of the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:

• In Mali: The national army and its allies continue to concentrate efforts on maintaining control over the northern and central regions against groups like the Permanent Strategic Framework and Al-Qaeda affiliates.
• In Burkina Faso: Over half of the nation’s territory endures constant pressure from recurring terrorist attacks.
• In Niger: Security forces must simultaneously secure the critical tri-border area (Liptako-Gourma) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the Lake Chad basin.

Given these demanding circumstances, none of the three states possesses sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a substantial contingent to a neighboring country without compromising their own national security apparatus.

The logistical challenges of a joint force

While the political decision to unify forces was agreed upon during the AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters significant material obstacles:

• Interopérability and command: Harmonizing diverse military doctrines and establishing an integrated command structure demands considerable time and robust, secure communication networks.
• Air support and renseignement: Projecting troops over vast distances across the Sahel requires substantial armored transport, resupply capabilities, and aerial intelligence (drones, combat aviation). These assets are currently limited and heavily utilized within each nation’s own operational areas.

The role of external partners

The departure of traditional military forces, particularly France and the UN mission MINUSMA, has led the three military regimes to pivot their partnerships towards Russia, notably through the deployment of the paramilitary Africa Corps. However, these support forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally tasked with conducting cross-border operations under the AES banner.

A strategic choice prioritizing intelligence

Beyond large-scale troop deployment, AES authorities emphasize an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted cross-border operations. For the Sahelian general staffs, intervention does not necessarily manifest as a visible grand deployment, but rather as coordinated actions within the tri-border zone, where each army primarily operates from its own territory.