On October 9, 2026, fierce fighting erupted between the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel near Tessit, close to the Burkina Faso border. Beyond the conflicting claims from both sides, these clashes raise a fundamental question: why do armed groups continue to operate in the very areas that military authorities claim to be securing?
Violent confrontations broke out on the morning of Friday, October 9, 2026, pitting the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) against the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) in the Tessit area, along the border with Burkina Faso.
According to sources close to the JNIM, its rival suffered a heavy defeat on multiple fronts. Conversely, sources linked to IS-S claim the JNIM was defeated and that new territories were conquered.
These contradictory accounts alone cannot establish the true outcome of the fighting. Yet they reveal a troubling reality: armed groups continue to vie for territory in the Sahel, while civilian populations remain exposed to insecurity, forced displacement, and the consequences of this war.
Armed groups still on the ground: a challenge the juntas can no longer ignore
These clashes highlight a major contradiction in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, united within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, the military authorities have made the reconquest of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism central pillars of their legitimacy. However, the persistence of armed groups and their ability to move, organize, and fight on the ground raises questions about the effectiveness of the strategies implemented.
The real problem lies not only in the existence of terrorist groups but also in the persistent difficulty states face in preventing their long-term entrenchment on their territories. The Tessit clashes illustrate this reality: while the two organizations fight over positions, populations continue to suffer from an insecurity that does not disappear despite repeated promises to restore order.
AES authorities regularly denounce foreign interference and accuse certain neighboring countries, depending on the circumstances, of facilitating armed group activities or serving as rear bases for their fighters. These accusations, however, must be examined in light of verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not, by itself, prove that its leaders support or willingly harbor them.
Nevertheless, an unavoidable question remains: how can military governments justify their security results when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to durably reestablish its authority?
Between sovereignty rhetoric and realities on the ground
One of the main challenges for Sahelian military regimes is now to demonstrate that their strategic choices yield concrete results. The change in military partners, the departure of Western forces, and the rapprochement with Russia have been presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.
Yet these changes alone are not enough to eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and the violence affecting various regions of the Sahel remind us that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, effective administration, civilian protection, and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territories.
A United Nations report published in 2026 describes persistent activity by the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in certain regions of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also notes clashes between these organizations for territorial control.
This reality undermines narratives that present security difficulties as solely the result of external maneuvers. Regional and cross-border factors do exist, but they do not absolve any government of accountability for its own results.
The question of staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how can persistent insecurity be prevented from becoming a permanent argument to justify the concentration of power and the postponement of a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders willingly harbor or nurture terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent, and verifiable elements.
However, it is legitimate to question the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent, while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their governance.
The distinction is fundamental: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity does not amount to claiming that leaders themselves orchestrate that insecurity. The former is political analysis; the latter demands proof.
Populations want results, not just explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims by the JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet allow a definitive determination of which group won the October 9 clashes. But this uncertainty does not change the core issue: these organizations remain capable of conducting operations and contesting control of certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are very real. Insecurity hampers movement, disrupts economic activities, and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances, and external enemies cannot durably replace measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger thus face a simple demand: demonstrate their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from becoming permanently established, and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners one chooses or the foreign forces one expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer this question: beyond rhetoric and accusations directed abroad, what lasting results can they demonstrate to guarantee the security of populations?
