What the Lomé accords mean for families, farms and local economies across Benin, Ghana and Togo

When Benin, Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso and the UN refugee agency signed three tripartite agreements in Lomé on 11 September, the immediate effect was not a single bus leaving a camp. It was a quiet shift in how one of West Africa’s largest displacement crises will be managed – with direct consequences for the families who fled, the communities that took them in and the local economies stretched by years of arrivals.

A framework with real consequences for thousands of households

The documents do not trigger an immediate repatriation. They create a working structure between Burkina Faso, the UNHCR and each host country – Benin, Ghana and Togo – covering consultation, monitoring and the preparation of any future return and reintegration operations.

That distinction matters on the ground. In a Sahel region shaped by forced displacement, the word “return” can quickly be read as a signal to pack up and leave. The principle defended by the UNHCR is different: any repatriation must be voluntary, safe and dignified, and refugees must be able to make an informed decision about their own future.

Host countries carrying a crisis they did not create

For years, insecurity in Burkina Faso has pushed thousands of people across borders. Benin, Ghana and Togo now find themselves on the front line of a crisis they had no part in creating – with tangible effects on local services, land use and public spending.

The numbers show the scale. In Benin, more than 11,000 refugees from Burkina Faso were registered as of 31 May 2026. In Ghana, June 2026 statistics recorded 13,368 Burkinabè refugees – nearly two-thirds of the country’s entire refugee population. Ghana set up reception centres in the border areas of Tarikom and Zini and, in February 2025, granted prima facie refugee status to Burkinabè seeking protection.

Togo has also absorbed a major influx of people fleeing Sahel insecurity. According to the UNHCR, the country hosted around 65,100 refugees and asylum seekers in June 2026, 86 percent of them from Burkina Faso.

These figures give the Lomé agreements a different weight. They are not about abstract population movements. Behind every possible return operation are families who left their villages, abandoned their belongings and in some cases lost relatives. Each return also reshapes demand for housing, farmland, schools and clinics in the areas they left – and eases pressure on the border towns that hosted them.

Return cannot hide the reasons people fled

This is where the role of the Burkinabè authorities becomes central. For several years, Burkina Faso has faced an insurgency led in part by Islamist armed groups, alongside serious allegations concerning operations by government forces and allied militias.

Human Rights Watch says the human rights situation deteriorated further in 2025. The organisation documents abuses attributed both to Islamist armed groups and to government forces and pro-government militias. It cites killings of civilians, forced displacement and growing restrictions on the media, the opposition and civil society.

In a report published in April 2026, Human Rights Watch documented 57 incidents and gathered testimony from hundreds of people to examine violence committed since 2023. The organisation considers that Burkinabè forces and their allied militias, like Islamist armed groups, are responsible for serious abuses that may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. It calls for accountability through credible investigations.

These allegations bear directly on the context in which refugees would be asked to return. A repatriation operation cannot be treated as a solution simply because a diplomatic agreement has been signed. For a farmer from a border village, the practical question is whether the fields are safe to work and whether the local market still functions. For a family with children in a host-country school, it is whether a school and a clinic will be waiting back home.

Military rule and the security guarantees question

Since the September 2022 coup, Burkina Faso has been led by military authorities under Captain Ibrahim Traoré. Human Rights Watch reports that the junta extended the transition period and reduced political and civic space, with measures targeting journalists, opponents and civil society organisations.

The organisation has also documented disappearances, forced conscription and restrictions on critical voices. In May 2026, it again denounced tightening measures against independent media and access to information.

For refugees, these elements are not secondary. The fundamental question remains protection: can they return to their villages without fearing fresh violence? Will their homes and land be accessible? Will they be able to obtain civil status documents, healthcare, schooling and a means of subsistence? And above all, will there be mechanisms to report any violations?

The UNHCR points out that a lasting return depends on the root causes of displacement being sufficiently addressed and on peace allowing people to live without being forced to flee again. For host economies, that also means any large-scale return would reduce the burden on border services – but only if it is durable and does not simply create a new displacement wave.

Benin, Ghana and Togo: the responsibility of host nations

In this context, the stance of Benin, Ghana and Togo is a key part of the regional response. By taking in people forced to flee, these three countries have shouldered a heavy humanitarian responsibility despite their own security and economic challenges.

The agreement signed in Lomé allows host countries to avoid setting reception against return. It gives them a framework to prepare for the future while maintaining the principle of voluntariness – a balance that matters for social cohesion in border communities where refugees and locals share schools, wells and markets.

It is also a signal of regional cooperation. The Gulf of Guinea states are directly exposed to the consequences of the Sahel crisis. Population movements do not stop at borders and therefore require coordination between states, international organisations and local communities.

Benin, Ghana and Togo can thus be seen not only as neighbours of Burkina Faso, but as actors in the regional response to the crisis – with a direct stake in whether returns are orderly or chaotic.

A signature, but not yet a return

The Lomé agreements are therefore more of a roadmap than a repatriation timetable. Their effectiveness will depend on how they are applied and, above all, on the conditions prevailing in Burkina Faso.

The message sent to refugees is clear: their return must be voluntary and must happen when conditions of safety and dignity are in place. That caution is all the more important given that the Burkinabè context remains marked by armed violence and allegations of abuses involving several parties to the conflict.

For Benin, Ghana and Togo, the challenge is now twofold: continue protecting those who need asylum while preparing, with the UNHCR and the Burkinabè authorities, the conditions for a possible return.

Because a refugee only truly goes home when they can live there in safety. The real success of the Lomé agreements will therefore not be measured by the number of people sent back to Burkina Faso, but by the number who are able to return freely, rejoin their communities and rebuild their lives without being forced to flee again.