Niger barracks rumbling after mutiny

The silence that has again settled over Niamey’s streets should not mislead anyone.

The battle is over, but the political war is only just starting.

During the night of 28 to 29 August, Nigerien soldiers attempted to topple the regime of General Abdourahamane Tiani. The attack, launched notably by troops coming from units engaged on the country’s various fronts, targeted strategic installations in the capital, among them Air Base 101 and areas near the presidential palace.

For several hours, the government hung in the balance.

And to save it, Tiani had to call on his Russian allies.

The men of Africa Corps, heirs to the Wagner setup in Africa, intervened alongside loyalist Nigerien forces. They took part in retaking the air base and neutralising the mutinous soldiers. It has been confirmed that the Nigerien army regained control of the base with support from the Russian paramilitary forces.

Here is the major political fact of this crisis: Nigerien soldiers were fought on Nigerien soil with the direct backing of Russian forces who came to protect a regime born of the 2023 coup.

Yet the junta had made national sovereignty its main argument for driving out French and American forces.

Sovereignty with variable geometry

For years, Tiani and his supporters told Nigeriens that the French military presence was a humiliation and an affront to national sovereignty.

The French soldiers left.

The Americans were asked to leave the country.

Western military agreements were denounced.

The regime’s propaganda could then proclaim that Niger had finally regained its full independence.

But an awkward question now arises: what is the point of chasing out the French military if, a few years later, the government has to call in Russian troops to save its presidential seat?

The question is all the more explosive because the Russians did not intervene to defend Nigerien territory against jihadist groups. They intervened to help the government push back Nigerien soldiers who threatened the regime.

The symbolism is devastating.

Nigerien soldiers have been dying for years in the Sahel’s war zones. They fight Islamic State and JNIM, suffer heavy losses, and regularly complain about their combat conditions. The Niamey mutiny seems to have been fuelled precisely by this frustration accumulated in units that face jihadist violence daily.

And when these same soldiers eventually turn against the government, it is the Russians who come to fight them.

What sovereignty remains when the national government can no longer ensure its own survival without foreign protection?

The rift between Tiani and his army

The 29 August mutiny is probably the most serious warning sign sent to Tiani since he came to power.

The problem is not only that soldiers tried to overthrow him.

The problem is that they could do so while Niger officially has a considerable security apparatus.

Above all, the dissent appears to have found fertile ground within the ranks of the regular army itself.

The soldiers deployed on the fronts are the ones who pay the highest price in the war. They see their comrades fall. They face material difficulties. They see jihadist attacks continue despite the junta’s promises.

Since 2023, Tiani promised to restore security and give Niger back its dignity.

Three years later, jihadist violence remains a major threat, and Nigerien forces continue to suffer significant losses.

It is in this context that part of the army now seems to be wondering whether the regime has drifted away from those who actually fight on the ground.

And the Russian intervention may well have turned that frustration into hatred.

A Nigerien soldier can accept dying to defend his country. He can accept hardship and sacrifice in the name of the nation.

But it will be far harder for him to accept that foreigners come and fire at him to protect a political regime.

Tiani, from Bazoum’s toppler to Moscow’s protégé

The historical paradox is dizzying.

In July 2023, Tiani seized power claiming he wanted to save Niger from a political system unable to guarantee the safety of its citizens.

He toppled Mohamed Bazoum, a democratically elected president, claiming to put an end to the failure of civilian rule.

Today, three years on, it is his own government that needs foreign fighters to withstand a military revolt.

The trajectory is hard to ignore.

Tiani came to power through a coup.

He now stays in power thanks to a security setup of which an essential component is Russian.

In other words, the man who claimed to free Niger from foreign tutelage seems to have swapped a Western dependency for a Russian one.

It is precisely this contradiction that could become the regime’s Achilles heel.

And if Bazoum had accepted French help?

One must also go back to July 2023.

When Tiani was overthrowing Mohamed Bazoum, France still had more than a thousand soldiers in Niger. Paris supported the elected president and, in certain circumstances, was considering an operation to help free him.

People close to Bazoum had asked for French intervention. According to the information reported at the time, an operation was considered, but Bazoum apparently preferred dialogue and refused to let French soldiers intervene directly.

That decision now belongs to history.

But a question remains: if Bazoum had accepted French intervention, would Tiani have succeeded in his coup?

Nobody can rewrite history with certainty.

But it is entirely reasonable to note that Tiani benefited from that hesitation. The elected president remained a prisoner in the presidential palace while the junta gradually consolidated its hold on the state apparatus.

The most ironic part is that today, the man who denounced the French presence in Niger calls on a foreign power to save his own government.

Algeria enters the game

As if the Russian presence were not enough, Algeria has just taken a new step.

After the attempt to overthrow Tiani, Algiers deployed military assets to Niamey, including combat and transport aircraft. This decision marks a significant shift in Algerian doctrine, long characterised by reluctance to commit its forces beyond its borders.

Algeria ultimately did not have to fight the mutineers: they had already been pushed back with the help of Russian forces.

But the message was clear.

Tiani would no longer be alone.

Moscow militarily protects the regime. Algiers now provides it with strategic support. And the junta can present this encirclement as proof that Niger has new allies.

But behind this show of force lies a troubling question: how many foreign powers will be needed to protect a government that seems to be gradually losing the support of part of its own army?

The volcano beneath the barracks

The 29 August mutiny may therefore not be an isolated incident.

It could be the first symptom of a much deeper rupture.

Russian weapons allowed Tiani to win a battle.

They did not resolve the frustrations of Nigerien soldiers.

They did not destroy the jihadist groups.

They did not bring back the soldiers who died at the front.

They did not reconcile the troops with the government.

They simply allowed the regime to survive a first overthrow attempt.

And that is precisely where the danger lies for Tiani.

A regime can control a palace with foreign help. It can retake a military base. It can arrest mutineers.

But it cannot indefinitely rule against an army that is beginning to see its own government as dependent on a foreign power.

General Tiani should therefore look beyond the walls of his palace.

The real danger to his regime may lie neither in Paris, nor in Washington, nor even in the Western capitals he regularly accuses of plotting against him.

It may lie in the Nigerien barracks.

And if the soldiers who saw their comrades fall under fire from foreign forces one day decide to settle scores with those they accuse of having handed their country to Moscow, the next mutiny could prove far harder to contain.

The Russians can protect Tiani.

Algeria can give him support.

But no foreign power can forever replace the loyalty of a national army.

Tiani’s regime may have won the battle of 29 August. But it may have lost something far more precious: the trust of some of those who wear the Nigerien uniform.